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support. Practicality may demand that one spouse be the manager of
community assets, but fairness demands the manager not be given unfair
advantages at the expense of the other spouse. Alternatively, the legisla-
ture should clarify the article to reflect its Spanish heritage by specifically
making alimentary obligations separate. The primary purposes of com-
munity property are to provide for the expenses of the common life and to
provide that the spouses share equally in the growth and acquisition of
assets produced by their common labor and industry. Without the consent
of the other spouse, neither spouse should be able to jeopardize the assets
properly belonging to the other in pursuance of his own affairs. By treating
alimentary obligations as separate such jeopardy would be avoided con-
sistently with the purposes of community property. Fairness and clarity
demand one alternative or the other, but as few persons would like the idea
of supporting a spouse's former spouse, in addition to the other reasons set
forth, the proposal that the obligations be made separate is more plausible.
Phillip L. McIntosh
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND TITLE VII-
MORE DEFERENCE TO THE REASONABLE PRACTICES OF
LAWMAKERS AND EMPLOYERS
Alleging racial discrimination in effect, though not in purpose, claim-
ants asserted that a personnel test given by the District of Columbia police,
resulting in the rejection of their job applications, was unrelated to job
performance and thus violated the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment as well as certain federal statutes.' Following a district court dismiss-
al,' the court of appeals3 found a constitutional violation, based upon the
criticized. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976
Term-Persons, 37 LA. L. REV. 305, 310-11 (1977).
I. Claimants, intervenors in a class action challenging D.C. police force
recruiting policies, asserted violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) and D.C. Code §
1-320 (1973 & Supp. 1975) requiring that police force appointments be made in
conformity with federal Civil Service provisions. The instant case dealt only with a
motion for summary judgment regarding the validity of a written Civil Service
personnel exam.
2. 348 F. Supp. 15 (D.C. 1972) (granting federal parties' motion for summary
judgment based on constitutional and statutory grounds and denying claimants'
motion based solely on the Constitution).
3. 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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disproportionate impact on blacks and the lack of job relatedness. Revers-
ing, the Supreme Court held that absent proof of a discriminatory purpose,
a practice is not unconstitutional solely because of a disproportionate racial
impact, and that tests given job applicants satisfy statutory standards
similar to those under Title VII4 if they are directly related to the require-
ments of valid training programs, even if not directly related to job
performance. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
While the fifth amendment contains no equal protection clause, the
requirements of due process imposed upon the federal government em-
body standards quite similar to those applicable to the states under the
fourteenth amendment. 5 Traditionally, the equal protection standard for
determining the permissibility of statutory classifications has been that the
disparate treatment be rationally related to the purpose of the legislation.
6
Cases involving suspect classes 7 or fundamental interests, 8 however, gen-
erally precipitate the more stringent standard of strict scrutiny. In such
instances, the government must bear the very heavy burden of showing a
compelling interest in treating persons unequally. 9 One explanation for
this stringent test where race is involved is that "the effects of racial
discrimination are so unacceptable that only a countervailing interest of
4. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII-Equal Employment Opportunity,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 & Supp. 11 1972). Title VII was inapplicable to the
federal government when the complaint was filed; although coverage was extended
prior to judgment, the complaint was not amended to state a Title VII claim.
5. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 (1975) (unjustifiable discrimi-
nation is violative of due process); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964);
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). The fifth amendment states that "No
person shall be . . .deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
the law," while the fourteenth amendment states that "No state shall ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
6. E.g., United States Dep't. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76
(1971). See Comment, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1065, 1076-87 (1969).
7. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race). Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (sex); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimacy).
8. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (travel); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (vote); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(criminal appeals).
9. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972) (must show substantial
and compelling reasons for burdening travel and voting); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (racial classification invalid absent overriding statutory
purpose).
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extraordinary weight, achievable in no other way, is enough to justify
them.'"'°
Although the case law is settled with regard to applying strict scrutiny
to intentional racial discrimination, courts have not been consistent in
cases involving adventitious inequality. In a 1973 school desegregation
case, Keyes v. School District No. 1,11 the Supreme Court, following
earlier decisions in other contexts, 12 emphasized the need for a finding of a
discriminatory purpose before abandoning the rationality test for that of
stringent review. 13 The meaning of "purpose" has not been clear: the
Court sometimes uses the term interchangeably with motive. Consequent-
ly language in decisions admonishing against investigation of legislative
motive and emphasizing statutory effect lends support for the proposition
that the operative impact of a law rather than its purpose is the controlling
factor. For example, the Supreme Court in Palmer v. Thompson 14 upheld
the closing of Jackson, Mississippi, public swimming pools, despite evi-
dence that the closure was "motivated by a desire to avoid integration"' 5
since the effect of the action was the same upon blacks and whites. While
acknowledging that some of its decisions suggested that legislative motive
or purpose is germane to constitutionality, the Court indicated that those
decisions rested upon the actual effect of the law. 6 In other contexts,
several courts of appeals, believing de facto disadvantage to be as harmful
as a willful scheme, have demanded demonstration of compelling govern-
10. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 317 (1972).
11. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
12. E.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (welfare benefits); James
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (housing referendums); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376
U.S. 52 (1964) (political districting).
13. The Court did not actually employ the term "strict scrutiny" in determining
that the de facto - de jure distinction vanishes upon a finding of a racially dis-
criminatory purpose. 413 U.S. at 208. As reflected in decisions dating from the early
1970's, the Court has been seeking new articulations of equal protection standards
of review. Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12-18 (1972).
14. 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (Douglas, White, Marshall, & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
15. Id. at 224. The refusal of the Court to examine motivation was criticized in
Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REv. 95 (1971).
16. Id. at 225. The Court distinguished the situation in Palmer from that in
Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) and
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). In Griffin, the state was perpetuating a
segregated school system by financing segregated private academies; and in Gomil-
lion the gerrymander of the boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama, excluded virtually
all blacks from voting in town elections.
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mental interest in cases involving rules which disproportionately harm
racial minorities-regardless of intent. 17
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,18 providing statutory
guidance for employers, decrees that any action with a disproportionate
impact upon protected persons is unlawful if attributable to race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.1 9 Although Title VII permits the use of
employment tests, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
(EEOC) guidelines demand that whenever a test adversely affects pro-
tected individuals, the employer must satisfy EEOC validation proce-
dures. A test, to be valid, must be significantly related to job perform-
ance.2" The Supreme Court endorsed this job relatedness requirement in
the 1971 decision, Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,21 refusing to allow an
employer to use tests which disadvantaged blacks and which did not
measure success on the job. The Court held that lack of discriminatory
intent does not redeem employment tests "that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation" and which are unrelated to measuring job
capability. 22 The Court recently reaffirmed Griggs, in Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody ,23 endorsing specific guidelines which require test correla-
tion with actual work operations.
17. E.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1288 (5th Cir. 1971)
(municipal services); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n., Inc. v. City of Lackawanna,
436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970) (zoning); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401
(D.C. 1967), aff'd, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (school segregation).
18. Title VII-Equal Employment Opportunity, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970
& Supp. 1 1972).
19. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2). But section 2000e-2(e) provides that it is not an unlawful
employment practice to base employment decisions on religion, sex, or national
origin (but not race) when these factors would be a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a business.
20. Id. § 2000e-2(h). This section permits the use of "professionally developed
ability tests." The meaning of this term has been greatly debated. For a detailed
discussion see Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment
Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1649-54 (1969); Comment, Developments in the Law-
Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1109, 1123-26 (1971). The EEOC guidelines on testing are published in 29
C.F.R. § 1607.1 et seq. (1975). Sections 1607.4-.5 provide validation requirements.
The guidelines demand that the employer demonstrate through empirical evidence
that his tests are predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of
work behavior as gauged by criteria which are fully described and fairly assessed.
Data must also be generated for minority and nonminority groups whenever techni-
cally feasible. Other proofs of validity are appropriate where criterion-related
validity is not feasible.
21. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
22. Id. at 431-32.
23. 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975). The current guidelines, inapplicable in Griggs, 401
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The authority of the EEOC guidelines is enhanced by numerous
supportive court of appeals decisions24 and by the fact that Congress
neither disapproved nor altered them while extensively amending Title VII
in 1972.25 Against the backdrop of substantial support for the Title VII and
EEOC standards and special concern for racial discrimination, various
courts of appeals have determined that these standards are applicable to the
adjudication of complaints of racial discrimination under the Constitu-
26tion.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court upheld the District of Colum-
bia police force's use of a Civil Service test despite proof of a black failure
rate four times greater than the failure rate of whites .2 Deciding the fifth
amendment issue first, the Court acknowledged that under Title VII tests
with adverse impacts are discriminatory and must meet stringent valida-
tion requirements; nevertheless, the Court explained, the statutory stand-
ard is not the constitutional rule. In constitutional adjudications mere
disproportionate impact is not sufficient cause for subjecting a practice
which is nondiscriminatory on its face to the harshness of strict scrutiny.
28
Applying the traditional standard, the Court found the examination to be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. 29 After disposing
of the constitutional issue, the majority addressed the statutory question of
job relatedness. The test satisfied the job relatedness requirement because
it was predictive of successful performance in the police training course
even though there was no direct correlation between the test and actual
elements of police work.30
U.S. at 433 n.9 (1971), specify the methods of proving job relatedness. Mr. Justice
Blackmun protested in Albemarle that too rigid an application of the guidelines
would force employers to choose between complex and costly validation studies or
subjective quota systems of hiring. 422 U.S. at 449 (concurring in judgment). See
Employment Discrimination and Title VII, supra note 20, at 1130.
24. E.g., Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Vulcan Soc'y. v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Georgia Power
Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
25. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,86 Stat.
Ill (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 & Supp. I 1972)). See H.R. REP.
No. 298, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 20-22, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2137, 2155-57.
26. E.g., Jones v. New York City Human Resources Adm'n., 528 F.2d 696,
698 (2d Cir. 1976); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 735 (1st Cir. 1972); Carter v.
Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 320, 322 (8th Cir. 1971).
27. 426 U.S. 229, 237 (1976).
28. Id. at 242.
29. Id. at 246.
30. Id. at 250. The willingness of the Court to forego proof of correlation with
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The Court's declaration that the statutory standard of Title VII is not
applicable to constitutional adjudication of employment discrimination
cases is of minor significance. Since only small employers are now
exempt from coverage under Title VII, 31 most litigants can rely directly on
the statutory provisions which, as the Court explains, are more demanding
than those of the Constitution.32 The importance of the case derives from
the Court's statements on elements of proof in constitutional litigation and
the effect of these pronouncements in areas other than employment.
Washington v. Davis resolves the conflict concerning whether pur-
pose or impact is the paramount factor in determining when a law contain-
ing no explicit racial classification33 is to be considered constitutionally
suspect. Standing alone, disproportionate impact is insufficient to estab-
lish racial discrimination, and without proof of a discriminatory purpose
the Court will not subject neutral enactments to the strict scrutiny normally
applied to racial classifications. Realization that a law subjected only to a
demand for rational justification is unlikely to be found constitutionally
infirm34 emphasizes the significance of the majority's clarification regard-
ing the constitutional standard. The Court in a case decided only weeks
after Washington indicated clearly that it will accord great deference to
legislative judgments under the rationality test. In City of New Orleans v.
Dukes,35 the Court expressly overruled Morey v. Doud,36 the only case in
recent years invalidating an economic regulation under the rationality test,
as an erroneous departure from the proper equal protection analysis 37 and
warned that the Court will not sit as a "superlegislature to judge the
wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas
that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines." 38
The Court presumed such legislative provisions to be constitutional and
stated that they need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
important elements of the employment at issue rests upon the conclusion that
recruit training is legitimate and essential to successful performance as a police
officer.
31. Private employers and state and local governmental units with fifteen or
more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in
the current or preceding calendar year are covered by the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b)
(Supp. 11 1972). Coverage also extends to the federal government. Id. § 2000e-16.
32. 426 U.S. at 247.
33. See the text at note 51, infra.
34. See Equal Protection, supra note 6, at 1077-87.
35. 96 S.Ct. 2513 (1976).
36. 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
37. 96 S.Ct. at 2518 (1976) (per curiam).
38. Id. at 2517.
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In Washington, the Court recognized the merit in the arguments of
those who attack the de facto - de jure distinction yet disapproved the
impact approach. 39 Conceding that disproportionate racial impact is not
irrelevant, the Court cited cases in various contexts spanning nearly one
hundred years in which a greater showing was required to prove invidious
discrimination.' The attitude of the Court is best reflected in the 1972
decision of Jefferson v. Hackney4 in which the Court upheld a Texas
statute allocating welfare benefits against an attack of disproportionate
racial impact. The Court determined that the acceptance of this constitu-
tional theory would "render suspect each difference in treatment . . .
however lacking in racial motivation and however otherwise rational the
treatment might be.' 42
Although not clearly stating which factors it will consider in ascer-
taining a purpose to discriminate, the Court did provide a broad outline of
the nature of the analysis. The Court, without lengthy explanation, stated
that an impermissible racial purpose can be proved by discriminatory
administration of an impartial law; the totality of relevant facts, including
disproportionate racial impact; and in jury selection contexts, by a total or
disproportionate exclusion of blacks or use of non-neutral selection proce-
dures. 43 Also, under certain circumstances the Court may infer a racially
discriminatory purpose on the basis of impact, but only where the unbal-
anced effect is very difficult to explain on non-racial grounds. 4
39. 426 U.S. at 244-45. The Court expressed disagreement with court of ap-
peals decisions in various contexts in which the appeals courts found racial dis-
crimination on the basis of impact alone, and demanded justification going substan-
tially beyond rationality.
40. Id. at 239-41. Cases ranged from Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303-
(1879) (jury selection) to Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (school
segregation).
41. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
42. Id. at 548. Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471(1970) (upholding AFDC
program imposing a maximum grant of $250 per month regardless of family size). In
Washington the Court also expressed concern that the impact approach would call
into question a whole range of statutes that might be more burdensome to the poor
and to the average black. 426 U.S. at 248.
43. 426 U.S. at 241-42.
44. Id. at 242. The majority does not elaborate on this point, but Justice
Stevens in his concurrence suggests that the line between effect and purpose is
indistinguishable when the disproportionate impact is as dramatic as in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (irrational gerrymander of city limits fencing out
virtually all black voters) or Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (permits to
operate laundries in wooden buildings issued to all but one of the non-Chinese
applicants but to none of about 200 Chinese applicants). Id. at 254. The majority
opinion, in citing jury cases as reflecting situations in which discriminatory purpose
19771
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In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp. , 5 the Court (applying the rule of Washington to a refusal to
rezone a tract of land to permit construction of multi-family, integrated
housing) furnished a more exact but nonexhaustive summary of factors
probative of an intent to discriminate.46 But more importantly the Court
explained that if a racially discriminatory purpose even partially motivates
a legislative decision the enactment is no longer deserving of deferential
treatment.47 This lack of deference does not mean that the Court will
automatically subject illicitly impelled laws to strict scrutiny, rather, as the
Court specified in dictum,48 whenever a decision is motivated in part by a
racial purpose, the burden shifts to the government to come forth with
proof that the same determination would have resulted had the impermis-
sible purpose not been considered. If this showing is made, judicial
interference with the challenged decision is unwarranted. 49
The Court is willing to invalidate only those laws propelled to
passage by an overriding intent to achieve a discriminatory objective.
Presumably instances will be few in which a discriminatory goal will be
the sine qua non of a legislative decision.5 ° Since in most cases the Court
was appropriately found and in which it can also be inferred from impact, lends
support to the observation of Justice Stevens.
45. 45 U.S.L.W. 4073 (Jan. 11, 1977).
46. Id. at 4077-78. In addition to the factors provided in Washington, the Court
listed as relevant the historical background, especially if it reveals official bias; the
specific sequence of antecedent events; departures from the normal procedural
sequence; and substantive departures in decisionmaking where factors usually
considered important strongly favor a contrary decision. The Court stated that
legislative or administrative history is highly relevant, particularly where there are
contemporary statements by decisionmakers, minutes of meetings, or reports.
47. Id. at 4078. The Court cites Brest, supra note 15, at 116-18 for a scholarly
discussion of legislative motivation. Professor Brest suggests that the act of adop-
tion, prompted by illicit motives, is itself an official insult independent of adverse
effect. Id. at 116 n. 109. While adverse effect may be benign, a collective legislative
judgment decisively premised upon a desire to achieve such an effect is not.
48. Since the complainants did not establish that a discriminatory purpose was
a motivating factor in the zoning decision, the Court's further explanation was
unnecessary. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4078.
49. Id. at 4078 n.21. It seems just that the decisionmaker must come forth with
proof that legitimate factors were actually considered and that these factors deter-
mined the outcome. To accept the argument that reasonable factors could have
supported the decision would not dispel the repugnancy of the biased action.
50. Even if a racially discriminatory purpose played a decisive role in the
judgment, decisionmakers will most likely disguise their true intentions. United
States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1976); cf. United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (discreet lawmakers will stress only acceptable
justifications). It is conceivable that a useful law could be invalidated under the
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will only demand proof that racial animus was not determinative of
passage, the rule of Washington serves primarily to insure that laws with
an adverse racial impact do not also inflict less palpable harms.
Even though the facts in Washington limited the complaint to racial
discrimination, the holding should logically extend to other classifications
the Court has deemed suspect;5 however, the Court should not apply the
rule to those situations in which the demand for compelling justification
rests upon the fundamental nature of the right affected52 rather than upon
the stigmatizing character of the classification. For example, in Dunn v.
Blumstein,53 the Court subjected Tennessee's durational requirement for
voting to strict scrutiny, not because of the character of the disadvantaged
group (new residents) but because the state cannot burden certain interests
(voting and travel) except for compelling reasons. Because of the impor-
tance of certain rights, even legitimately motivated restrictions are un-
reasonable, and discriminatory intent should not be germane to the con-
stitutionality of impingements on these interests. 54 Nevertheless, where
intent is determinative, the Court will not apply strict scrutiny to impartial
laws faulted only for disproportionate racial impact, and the import of the
ruling in Washington is strengthened by the silence of the dissenters on the
constitutional issue.
The holding on the question of job relatedness contains implications
for Title VII, even though the Supreme Court, unlike the district court and
court of appeals, decided the issue under other statutes. 55 But since the
Court deemed the standard it applied to be similar to Title VII require-
ments, 56 the acceptance of validation for training course performance
rather than actual job performance has significance for Title VII litigation.
The dissenters perceived the result as inconsistent with Griggs and Al-
bemarle5 7 and contrary to the EEOC guidelines which the Court has
previously endorsed. 58 The dissenters argued that if the Court permits
rule, but in such situations it is unlikely that there would be urgent reasons suffi-
cient to justify lawful repassage until the stigmatizing effect of the previous enact-
ment had dissipated.
51. See the cases cited in note 7, supra.
52. See the fundamental interest cases cited at note 8, supra.
53. 405 U.S. 330 (1971).
54. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
55. The Supreme Court decision was based on Civil Service provisions made
applicable by D.C. Code § 1-320 (1973 & Supp. 1975).
56. 426 U.S. at 249.
57. Griggs and Albemarle are discussed in the text at notes 21-23, supra.
58. 426 U.S. at 259 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). The EEOC
guidelines specify that noncriterion-related validity is appropriate only where
criterion-related validation is not technically feasible. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1975).
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validation of written qualification tests through correlation with scores on
written training course exams, people who have good verbal skills will
achieve high scores on both tests regardless of actual job-specific ability. 59
The majority, viewing a minimum level of communicative skill as practi-
cally essential to police work and accepting the legitimate need for recruit
training, determined that a positive relationship between test scores and
training course performance was sufficient validation. The Court found
this approach a "much more sensible construction" of job relatedness and
"not foreclosed" by Griggs or Albemarle.' However, the Court's will-
ingness to forego proof that the test was predictive of actual job perform-
ance was based upon judicial cognizance 61 of the necessity of police
training programs. This understanding may be lacking in other contexts.
Washington v. Davis is a pivotal case in the areas of equal protection
and employment discrimination as defined by federal statutes. In evaluat-
ing future claims of unconstitutional racial discrimination, courts will no
longer reason backwards from adverse impact to illicit purpose-nor will
they avoid finding a discriminatory purpose by characterizing purpose as
irrelevant. The decision also creates doubt whether the Court shares the
EEOC's views on acceptable methods of test validation although the
Court's brief treatment of the issue leaves few concrete impressions.
Robert G. Nida
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES:
THE NEW SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A successful tort plaintiff sought to satisfy his judgment against a
police jury by causing eighty acres owned by that entity but leased for
agricultural purposes to be seized and sold after informal negotiations and
numerous pleas for payment proved unfruitful. The Third Circuit Court of
59. 426 U.S. at 270.
60. Id. at 250-51. This "sensibleness" construction resembles the concept of
construct validity which is demonstrated by examinations structured to measure the
degree to which job applicants have identifiable characteristics that have been
determined to be important in successful job performance. Id. at 247 n.13. The
court of appeals labeled this common sense theory as equivalent to a finding of
construct validity. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 965, (D.C. Cir. 1975).
61. 426 U.S. at 250 (stating that the need for the program seems conceded;
usefulness of minimum verbal skill apparent).
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